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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON LIVING TRUSTS
By Ralph G. Lindstrom of the Denver Bar

T will be the object of this article to make some general observations with reference to so-called "Living Trusts". No
attempt will be made to comprehensively treat even of
fundamentals, but rather only to comment or perhaps speculate in a desultory way on some matters of interest.
The development of trust companies, thoroughly organized and efficient, has given such an impetus to trust arrangements of almost illimitable variety, that one might wonder a
bit if we were returning to so general a practice of having
legal title in one person, and use and enjoyment in another, as
caused Lord Bacon to observe:
. .. "By this course of putting lands into uses there were many inconveniences,
as this use, which grew first from a reasonable cause, namely, to give men the
power and liberty to dispose of their own, was turned to deceive many of their
just and reasonable rights, as namely, a man that had cause to sue for his
land knew not against whom to bring his action nor who was the owner of it.
The wife was defrauded of her thirds, the husband of being tenant by curtesy,
the lord of his wardship, relief, heriot, and escheat, the creditor of his extent
for debt, the poor tenant of his lease; ... "

The situation then resulted in 27 Hen. VIII C. 10, converting the beneficial into legal ownership, until equity intervened with certain well-known exceptions. It would be interesting to speculate as to the possible future legislative result
of the present marvelous growth of trusts, and particularly
"Living Trusts," but that is not within the purview of this
article. Suffice it to say that possible legislative experiment,
as well as judicial declarations deserve careful consideration
by the settlor of a trust.
Many arrangements popularly deemed trusts, are clearly
only agencies. Then we have the polarity of unequivocal
trusts. Midway is the borderland where the settlor retains
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rather complete supervision (although divesting himself of
legal title), right of revocation, change of present and future
cestui que trust, etc. As affects rights, not only inter partes,
but as to third persons, the exact relationship is very important.
In case of clear agency of course, wherever the principal's general directions are followed the conduct of the agent
is that of the principal, with certain well-known exceptions.
A trustee, as an administrator or executor, is, in law, individually and not officially, liable for tort or negligence.
In Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, 180 Ky. 609, 203 S.
W. 555, reported in 7 A. L. R. 396, with a complete annotation at 408, it is stated that
"the general rule is that the trustee is liable in his individual, and not in
his official, capacity, and this, for the sound reason that the trustee should not
be allowed, by his tort or negligence, to impair the trust fund."

In the Morgan case, suit was dismissed against the trustee,
officially, and sustained, individually. The cases also hold
trustees liable for negligence of their employees and for violation of statutes. An illustrative decision is Bannigan v. Woodbury, 158 Mich. 206, where the court baldly said that the
estate could not be held where the cause of action arose after
decease of the intestate.
In passing, reference is made to a comprehensive article
in 28 HarvardLaw Review 725 under the caption, "Liabilities
Incurred in the Administration of Trusts." In that article, it
is shown how equity has in some instances, altho admitting
legal liability, relieved the administrative officer.
However, generally in law, the administrative officer is
liable, in absence of express contrary stipulation, under contracts made for the benefit of the estate, even under authority
of court, for torts, and in absence of exempting statute, for
unpaid stock subscriptions, stockholders liability, etc.
Of course, in Colorado, Sec. 2272, Comp. Laws, 1921,
gives specific exemption to the trustee, but subjects the estate
to liability. Query what the result would be if the trustee,
without authority, invested in stock not fully paid up, or in
bank stock?
Since a true trustee cannot be the agent of the cestui que
trust, the latter cannot be held, whereas of course the principal
would be liable for the acts of his agent.

DICTA

Enough has been noted to illustrate the importance of
knowing whether an agency or trust exists.
It were a hopeless task to attempt to draw that distinction
in this brief article, but what was, at least in the inception of
trust law, a fundamental, might well be borne in mind, namely, that "The cestui que trust has no remedy except by subpoena in chancery." Perry on Trusts, p. 12, 5th Ed.
Our own Supreme Court has said in Bowes v. Cannon, 50
C. 262, 266:
"In its technical sense, a trust is the right, enforceable only in equity, to
the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title of which is in another."

, Undoubtedly, this doctrine has been much modified, but
in its essential, that relief lies solely in equity, it remains. If
this be right, and the settlor, whether as settlor or cestui que
trust, retains the right to revoke, to control investments,
change beneficiaries, etc., it seems quite clear that during the
lifetime of the maker-cestui que trust, he has retained abundant remedy other than by subpoena in chancery. After his
death, quite certainly there is a trust, for then the beneficiary
may have relief, only by process in equity, but up to that time,
with complete remedies reserved to him by the creating instrument, the existence of a trust seems open to question.
Many people are unwilling to have their trust arrangements made matter of public record. They therefore make
conveyance to a trustee, sometimes with nothing but a secret
declaration of trust from such trustee, with nothing in the
conveyance of real estate or in the grant of personalty to indicate the trust. Manifestly such a situation is hazardous, both
for the trustee and the cestui que trust.
Obviously the cestui que trust may lose his property to
judgment creditors of the trustee, particularly if it be real
estate, standing in the trustee's name. Then the trustee also
risks liability for unpaid stock, stockholders' liability, etc.,
where trust property is carried in his own name. 1 Machen,
Corporations, Sec. 709; 28 Harvard Law Review, 726.
In 39 Cyc. 409 it is said that investment in the name of
the trustee makes him absolutely liable for loss, irrespective
of the question of good faith and in 26 R. C. L., p. 1313, Sec.
170, the rule of liability is baldly stated as the same for invest-
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ments in the trustee's name in good faith, as for willful conversion.
Of course acquiescence or ratification relieves the trustee
from liability, 168 Ill. 589, at 604, and under the more liberal
rule of New York, a trustee may safely consolidate trust funds
in the purchase of securities, so long as he keeps a clear record
of the various trust funds, (so that each separate fund can be
clearly traced) reports to beneficiaries fully the facts, and
receives no objection, In re Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514.
However, in that decision there is a dissent which forcefully
says the general principles declared in the majority opinion
required an opposite conclusion.
On this point, then, the trustee should have the most specific authority in the event titles or securities are carried in
the individual name of the trustee, without disclosure of the
trust; but if such practice is sufficiently sanctioned to protect
the trustee, the trust fund itself may be endangered. This is,
perhaps more the case as to real estate than personal property,
for the record title may not be contradicted as to judgment
creditors. However, even as to personalty, the beneficial
owner may be confronted in equity with certain equitable
maxims which might cause loss of his property to the trustee's
creditors.
Neither will it suffice to follow the individual name of
the trustee with the mere word "trustee" or "trustee for" so
and so. Manifestly stock or bond registrars will require definite showing of the trust on any transfer and as to real estate
such statements are merely descriptive of the person.
As to personalty, the situation must also be considered
from the standpoint not only of the registrar of stocks or
bonds, but also the transferee. The C. C. A. for the Eighth
Circuit in Geyser-Marion Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558, says the
term "trustee" in stock books gives notice of a trust and there
is no presumption of authority in the trustee to sell or transfer.
There the registrar was forced to compensate the cestui for
loss sustained. Transferees also may be required to compensate cestuis for loss, where they take title without investigation under such circumstances, Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass.
382; Duket v. Natl. Mech. Bank, 86 Md. 400; Marbury v.
Ehlen, 72 Md. 206.
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The public policy for Colorado as to real estate records
is rather definitely settled by Sec. 4877 Comp. Laws, 1921.
Under that section, relating to conveyance of real estate, not
only must the trustee be described as such for certain beneficiaries, naming them, but the conveyance must either
"define the trust or other agreement under which the grantee is acting
•. . [or] refer by proper description to book, page, document number or file,
to an instrument, order, decree or other writing, which is of public record in
the county in which the land so conveyed is located,* in which such matters
shall appear."

Lacking any of these essentials, the partial description is to
be considered of the person only, and not as notice of a trust.
Note that the trust must be "defined", -orotherwise there must
be reference to some instrument otherwise of record, which
is the basis of the trust.
Then, of course, there are spendthrift trusts, sometimes
settled by the maker for himself as cestui, and upon his death
for the benefit of other cestuis, or for others from the beginning. These cases raise some interesting questions. Manifestly a settlor should not be permitted to create a spendthrift
trust for himself as beneficiary, reserving the right of revocation, and thus defeat creditors. Indeed, Brown . McGill,
39 Atl. 613, goes further and holds for Maryland (where
spendthrift trusts are approved), that a feme sole, in contemplation of marriage, cannot settle her own property upon a
trustee in trust for herself for life, for her separate use, without power of anticipation. The court said she could not thus
place her own property beyond the reach of those who should
subsequently become her creditors.
Therefore, Maryland, approving spendthrift trusts, disapproves them where the settlor is to be cestui. It is anomalous that England, hostile to restraint on alienation, nevertheless permits such arrangements, while here, where spendthrift
trusts are more favorably regarded, they are disapproved. See
12 Harvard Law Review 54.

The case of Benedict v. Benedict, 104 Atl. 581, is a Pennsylvania decision involving property conveyed by the settlor
to a trustee in trust for the settlor for life with remainder in
EDrrmo's NOTs:

Unless otherwise indicated all italics herein are the author's.
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trust for his wife and children subject to the settlor's right to
shift this remainder by will. It is to be noted therein that the
settlor reserved the right to change, not the terms as to the
present beneficiary, but as to the beneficiaries by remainder
only. The court held the property subject to claims of the
settlor's creditors. This seems then to be the test: has the
settlor reserved the right to change either present or remaindermen beneficiaries. If so, then he is deemed to have retained such rights of ownership, that the transfer is fraudulent
as to subsequent creditors, as an attempt to free it from liabilities of ownership. Scott v. Keane, 87 Md. 709; Ghormley v.

Smith, 139 Pa. St. 584. But where the donor has definitely
and conclusively given away the remainder while creating the
trust, the courts allow subsequent creditors to proceed merely
against the life interest, the property of the donor-beneficiary.
Jackson v. Sezdlitz, 134 Mass. 342; Schenck v. Barnes, 156
N. Y. 36, 50 N. E. 967. This view seems logical, for a man
without present debts, can give away all his property directly
or by a trust arrangement, and subsequent creditors can reach
his property, which is his beneficial life estate, but should
not be permitted to touch that which is no longer his.
Of course, where the trustee of a spendthrift trust is the
sole cestui, the legal and equitable titles merge. Rose v. Hatch,
125 N. Y. 427, 431. But not where one of several trustees is
beneficiary for life, Story v. Palmer,46 N. J. Eq. 1, or where
one of several beneficiaries is sole trustee, 33 Harvard Law
Review 483.

No doubt-there are many attempts by living trusts to avoid
inheritance taxes or death duties. These attempts will in most
cases prove unsuccessful because the settlor does not make an
absolute and irrevocable transfer, but endeavors to retain almost as much control as a principal over his agent; see New
England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 205 Mass. 279, wherein A settled

the income from a certain principal fund on B for five years,
with a five year extension in absence of termination by the
settlor, the beneficiary to receive the principal in event of the
settlor's death without revocation. On A's decease with the
trust still in effect, it was held that the principal was a gift
intended to take effect at death and so was subject to inheri-
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tance tax. The decision rested largely on the settlor's right
of revocation.
But State Street Tr. Co. v. Treas. etc., 209 Mass. 374,

involved $100,000 placed in trust by A with income to be paid
to B and C during A's lifetime, and at her death the principal
to be paid to the survivor of B and C, with right of appointment by B and C, should A survive them. The trust was for
a consideration, and irrevocable. At A's death, B and C contended that the principal was not subject to inheritance tax,
but the court ruled, at page 378:
"It is the first contention of the defendants in the second appeal, who are
the beneficiaries under the trust, that they are exempt, as the transfer of the
property in question became complete in the lifetime of the donor or settlor.
By the terms of the instrument creating the trust no power of revocation is
reserved. The test, however, by which the exemption is to be ascertained does
not depend upon whether a power to revoke has or has not been inserted, but
upon the passing of the property with all the attributes of ownership independently of the death of the transferror. It is the absence of the power of
control with the unrestricted right of the recipient to dispose of the property
and to receive and make use of the proceeds, which by the express language of
the statute subjects it to the tax."

It should be noted that in both of the Massachusetts cases
referred to the settlor was not the cestui, and in one there was
no right of revocation. See also Matter of Bostwick, 160
N. Y. 489, and Lamb v. Monav, 140 Iowa 89, the latter of
which contains a very helpful discussion of the subject, and
this broad generalization (p. 95) :
It is no doubt true that the owner of an estate cannot defeat the tax by
any device which secures to him for life the income, profits, or enjoyment
thereof. The conveyance must be such as passes the possession, the title,
and the enjoyment of the property in the grantor's lifetime."

Reference is sometimes made to the New Jersey case of
Wolf v. Comptroller, 105 Atl. 871, as authority for the proposition that the donor may make an absolute, irrevocable transfer, and take back a declaration from the grantee as trustee,
whereby life income is secured to him, and thus escape the
death duty. The court's decision, it should be remarked,
seems to be specifically bottomed on the conclusion that the
case involved no trust at all. However, In re Wilmarth's
Estate, 174 N. Y. 5, 885, is definite authority for escape from
an estate tax by an absolute and irrevocable transfer from A

DICTA

to B with a subsequent declaration of trust back from B to A
for the income for A's life.
But 26 Ruling Case Law 223, unqualifiedly states the rule
that reservation of income for life, by whatever means, renders the property subject to death duty.
Finally we will consider the endeavor of one spouse to
defeat the right of the surviving spouse to receive fifty per
cen.t. of the estate of the deceased spouse.
Personally, I believe when our Supreme Court has finally
spoken to the point, that any living trust, whether revocable
or irrevocable, which assures the grantor all the benefits of
ownership, during the grantor's lifetime, free from the burdens of ownership, will not serve to cut off the surviving
spouse's right to one-half of the property. In this, I apprehend that many readers may disagree. Such, however, is my
view of the several leading Colorado decisions on the point.
The first of these was the case of Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo.
480, decided by Judge Hayt in 1896. There Smith secretly
conveyed to his children by deeds not recorded until four
years after execution and on the eve of his death. There was
no declaration of trust back but the surviving spouse showed
retention of all income by the grantor, during his lifetime. At
page 484, after setting out our statutes, the Court says:
"It is the obvious intent and purpose of the foregoing acts to provide the
widow with the necessary means for her support in case of the death of the
husband, whenever his property is sufficient for that purpose. Under these
statutes appellee contends that where the husband during coverture secretly
makes conveyance of all his property and keeps the knowledge thereof from
his wife, thereafter retaining control and management of the same, that such
conveyance should be treated and considered as testamentary in character and
not as a deed, and in so far as the wife is deprived thereby of more than one
half the real property it should be held void as to her."

After an analysis of decisions by other jurisdictions and
much mixture of law and sentiment, the Court reasons at
pages 488 and 489, as follows:
"It is not necessary in this case, and is not our intention to say anything
that will prevent the husband, during his lifetime, from selling his personal
property, or transferring his real estate for such consideration as he may be
willing to accept, or without consideration, provided always that the transaction shall be absolute and bona fide, and not colorable merely, but what we
do say is, where, as here, the complaint charges, and the evidence shows, that
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the transaction complained of is colorable only and resorted to by the husband
for the purpose of defeating his wife's right as his heir, he hoping thereby to
obtain the full benefit of the property to the last hour of his life, and at the

same time being able to deprive her of all interest therein as his heir, is as much
of a fraud on the part of the husband as it is for a debtor, having in contemplation the incurring of an indebtedness, to put his property beyond his controL
and the courts have universally declared the latter to be in violation of the
statute of frauds. The same principle should govern in this case. The transaction is shown to have had its inception in a desire on the part of both the
grantor and grantees to deprive the wife and stepmother of the benefits conferred upon her as an heir of her husband under our statutes, and the action
of the district court in characterizing the transaction a fraud upon the rights
of the wife as an heir is founded upon the plainest principles of justice and
equity and must be sustained."

The decision seems to pivot on the fact that the grantor
hoped by his arrangement "to obtain full benefit of the property to the last hour of his life," in other words to retain the
equitable interest during life and to have the legal title and
the equitable merge to defeat his wife's rights, upon his death.
The second case was that of Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo.
576, decided by Justice Steele in 1903, on a different state of
facts. There Phillips conveyed to his daughters by deeds
placed by him in a safe box for a time, and later delivered the
deeds to the daughters, who recorded them. Phillips' wife
was advised of the existence of the deeds. At nisi prius it was
found that the grantor intended, when he made the deeds, that
they should be testamentary in character, but later changed
his mind and delivered the deeds; further that he collected
rents and treated the property after the conveyance, as his
own. The finding as to the retention of income was particularly questioned by Judge Steele, and apparently had he
agreed with the lower court he would not have felt justified
in sustaining the conveyance as against the widow, as he did,
for at pages 521 and 522, we read:
"The testimony wholly fails to establish a fraudulent agreement. It is
said that the fact that the daughters allowed the father to retain the general
supervision of the property, collect the rents, pay the taxes, etc., is evidence of
such fraudulent agreement. Mr. Phillips did not collect all the rents and did
not pay all the taxes. The daughters collected a part of the rent, and gave
receipts in their own names. When a grantor is permitted by his grantee to
retain the possession of real estate and collect and retain the rents, the transaction presents some suspicious features; but when the transaction is between
parent and child, the suspicious circumstances may be explained. It was per-
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fectly natural for the daughters to authorize their father to take the general
supervision of this property, and it was natural for him, as their father, to
care for the property and to desire to have over it a general supervision; and
we cannot assent to the assertion of counsel that there was a fraudulent or
collusive compact between the father and his daughters."

In other words, Judge Steele felt impelled to make quite
clear that there was no retention of income by the grantor.
The court further says as to the Smith case:
"In the Smith case, as we read it, it is decided that a husband may dispose
of his property for the purpose of defeating the right of the wife, and unless
the transaction is colorable merely, or is attended with circumstances indicating
fraud, it will be good as against the wife; and the fact that the husband intended to defeat her right is not in itself sufficient to invalidate the conveyance-there must be participation in fraudulent conduct by the grantee."

The decisions, thus far, make much of the matter of income to the grantor for life from the property conveyed, apparently making that matter largely determinative.
Then in 1918 we come to the third case, that of Grover v.
Clover, 69 Colo. 72. There Grover executed a deed to a
trustee for the use of his son, with the following condition:
"That all the rents, income and profit of the said property, as the same
accrue after deducting taxes and other proper expenses, be paid to me during
my natural life, and upon my death the said trust shall thereupon at once cease
and determine and the said premises hereby conveyed shall thereupon become
vested in my son, Charles Glenn Grover, and I direct that a deed so conveying
the same to him shall at once by said trustee be made, executed and delivered
to my said son."

The Supreme Court, at page 75, in sustaining the lower
court in its decision that the transaction was colorable only
and a fraud on the rights of the wife, reasoned as follows:
"We think the case comes clearly within the principle announced in
Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128, 34 L. R. A. 49, 55 Am. St. Rep.
142. In that case and under a similar state of facts, Chief Justice Hayt, in a
very able opinion held that notwithstanding that there exists in this state no
right of dower, yet the spirit and letter of our statutes impose the duty upon
the husband having property, to provide for the support and comfort of his
widow after his demise, and that where the husband disposed of his property
both real and personal, the transaction was colorably merely, and resorted to
by him for the purpose of defeating his wife's right, but with the intent to
reserve the benefit of the property to himself for life, it is a fraud upon the
rights of his wife, from which she may be relieved after death. . . . Again,
it has long been held that the policy of the law will not permit property to be
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so limited as to remain in the grantor for life, free from the incidents of property and not subject to his debts. 4 Kent. Com. 311; Bump on Fraudulent
Conveyance, Sec. 189; Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. St. 584, 21 Atl. 135, 11
L. R. A. 565, 23 Am. St. Rep. 215."

The fourth decision is Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. S16. There

Justice Denison sustained a deed given by a mother to her
daughter, a few days before the mother's death, thereby defeating the husband's one-half interest at death. At page 517
we read:
"The proof in this case, however, does not bring it within the scope of
that decision the ground of which was that the deed there in question was
merely colorable-that is, counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth
(Webster)-not really intended as a deed. Phillips V. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516,

71 Pac. 363, 258.
One cannot give away land without depriving his heirs of it.

He is

presumed to intend the obvious consequences of his own acts. He must therefore be regarded as intending to deprive his heirs of what he gives away; but
all agree that he may give. Is it not, then, evident that the intent is irrelevant,
that if the deed is genuine, it is valid, but that if it is a mere pretense it is
invalid? In other words, if colorable it is invalid, otherwise valid.
It is not the purpose, then, of a deed of a husband or wife that invalidates it as against the other, but the fact, if it be a fact, that the deed is a
pretense. The mere fact, therefore, that Mrs. Jones' deed was intended to
deprive her husband of his inheritance is not sufficient to render it invalid.
Phillips v. Phillips, supra."

Also at page 518 the Court says:
It is suggested in the cases cited above that if the deed of one spouse is
fraudulent as against the other it is invalid, but no case makes it clear what
constitutes fraud in such a case. There can be no fraud in doing a lawful
thing. If, therefore, one spouse may lawfully give away his or her property,
as all agree either of them may, such gift is not fraudulent per se, and the fact
that it deprives the other of his or her inheritance therein, since, of course, it
always does and must do so, cannot make it fraudulent. How can one fraudulently deprive another of that of which he may lawfully deprive him? However this question may be answered it is clear from what we have said that
the decision below was wrong."

Returning to page 517, we find the Court recognizing the
necessity of negativing retention of income for life in the
grantor, in order to defeat at death the one-half interest in
the surviving spouse, for the decision says:
"It is urged that it is shown that the deed herein questioned was not genuine but a pretense by the evidence that the grantor continued in possession,

14
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but it also appeared that the grantee resided there with her mother before and
continued to reside there after the execution of the deed and until the latter's

death. Moreover the undisputed testimony of the plaintiff and Mr. King, the
attorney who drew the deed in question, shows that one purpose of the conveyance was to reward the plaintiff for her care of her mother for several years
next before its execution. Under such evidence the court could not find the
deed to be colorable, and, indeed, did not expressly so find."

In a fifth case, Taylor vs. Taylor, 79 Colorado 487, a case
involving deeds to a mistress, with actual control retained by
the grantor, our Supreme Court in setting aside the deeds made
this positive statement at pages 489-90:
"The rule in this State is that deeds so given are lawfully delivered if
with the intent to really and actually take effect, but not if they are merely
colorable, that is, a mere pretense or intent to take effect at death."

Therefore it would seem safe to conclude that where a
grantor-settlor retains control of property conveyed to his
trustee and with right of revocation during his lifetime, if the
effect of the trust at the grantor-settlor's death is to deprive
a surviving spouse of one-half of the property, such surviving
spouse may set aside the trust, at least to the extent of taking
her one-half of the property. Of course the rule would apply
either to personalty or to realty.
Another recent case of possible application and interest
even in case of a genuine living trust without right of revocation and with a more sweeping authority to the trustee, is the
decision of our Supreme Court in Mulcahy vs. Johnson, 80
Colorado 499. While there the beneficiary appealed to the
court to exercise its powers as chancellor, it would seem that
almost to the same degree a settlor-grantor-beneficiary of a
living trust could do so, and at page 514 the court said:
"Unquestionably the testator intended to give to his trustees in the management of the trust estate the largest and fullest powers which one may confer by deed or will. The modern tendency of the courts is not to interfere
with the exercise of such discretionary power. This, however, does not prevent the Courts from exercising the powers of a chancellor, upon the complaint
of an aggrieved party, to determine whether or not there has been an abuse or
pcrversion by the trustees of their discretionary power. The right of an aggrieved party to apply to the courts for relief cannot be divested however
sweeping may be the powers which have been conferred upon trustees."

Turning again to jurisdictions other than Colorado we
find an interesting case in New Jersey where on April 8, 1925,
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the Court of Chancery decided National Newark & Essex
Banking Company v. Rosahl, 128 Atl. 586, which apparently
was a more or less ex parte proceeding wherein the trustee
asked for directions of the court in administering a trust.
In that case, .Rosahl conveyed to the trust company certain securities, upon trust to pay the net income to him for life,
thence to his widow for life, and the corpus to his lawful issue;
if no widow or issue, then to pay the net income to his mother,
and upon her death to his three sisters, and thereafter the
corpus as appointed by the grantor's will or in default of
appointment to his next of kin. Right of revocation was reserved by the settlor. This reservation was of the right to "revoke as an entirety this deed of trust."
Shortly before his death, the settlor executed an instrument called an "amendment" to his deed of trust wherein he
attempted certain modifications. The court held that the trust
was complete and not testamentary for the reason that the
property passed out of the control of the grantor and vested
in the trustee to the beneficial use of the cestuis que trustent.
As to the right of revocation the court said: "If the power of
revocation is not exercised, the interest remains vested as
though such power had not been reserved." 1 Perry on Trusts,
137. The court further says, (page 587) :
"The distinction between trusts thus created and transfers of property

to take effect after death, as in Stevenson v. Earl, 65 N. J. Eq. 721, 55 A. 1091
Am. St. Rep. 790, 1 Ann. Cas. 49, upon which the administrator relies, is that
in the one the property immediately passes out of the donor, while in the other
it remains in him and passes at death. The doctrine of that case, as pointed

out by Chancellor Walker in Robeson v. Duncan, 74 N. J. Eq. 745, 70 A. 685,
applies to the disposition in his lifetime of property which will be in the donor
at the time of his death, the tradition to take place at or after death . . . It
can have no application to a case where the grantor has by his conveyance

divested himself of his property in his lifetime."
"The courts have frequently upheld such trusts as against attacks that
they were testamentary. Green v. Tulane, 52 N. J. Eq. 169, 28 A. 9. See,

also, New Jersey Title Guarantee Trust Co. v. Archibald, 91 N. J. Eq. 82,
108, A. 434; Kaufman v. Edwards, 92 N. J. Eq. 554, 113 A. 598; Dunn v.
Houghton (N. J. Ch.) 51 A. 71."

The decision thus far would seem to indicate that the
right of inheritance might thus be defeated. However, the
court unqualifiedly holds otherwise in this statement.
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"'When, however, it plainly appears that a revocable trust to take effect
in enjoyment at the death of the trustor was created in evasion of the statute
of wills, equity will decline to enforce it. Kelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70
N. E. 89; Seaman v. Harmon, 192 Mass. 5, 78 N. E. 301; McEvoy v. Boston
Five Cent Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465; Brown v. Crafts, 98
Me. 4, 56 A. 213. There is no evidence in this case indicating such a purpose."

The court then went on to hold that the settlor had not
disturbed the rights of the cestuis by the "amendment"; that
the settlor could have destroyed the trust altogether but could
not modify it.
It is interesting to review the authorities cited in the
Rosahl case.
Seaman v. Harmon, 192 Mass. 5, involved a mortgage,
which one Seaman caused to be placed on land which he had
conveyed by its previous owners to his sister, in trust to pay
to Seaman the rents and profits during his life and also at his
request to sell and convey and pay the proceeds to him, or to
mortgage the same, also to convey the same to whomsoever
he might appoint in his will or in default thereof to convey
the same to his heirs at law. At the request of Seaman, the
trustee placed a mortgage on the land for $3200.00 and plaintiff who was the wife but separated from her husband, the
settlor, at the time the trust was made, and who was later
divorced, attempted to restrain foreclosure of the mortgage
on the theory that the trust arrangement had for its purpose
the defeat of her dower rights.
The court took great pains to show that Seaman, the settlor, never had legal title, that he had only an equitable title
to which dower does not attach in Massachusetts. The court
further carefully points out that the mortgagee paid a valuable consideration for the mortgage which he sought to foreclose. While the court specifically found that the power of
revocation was not inconsistent with the creation of a valid
trust yet it is to be noted that the very trust arrangement provided that in the absence of appointment by will the property
was to go to the settlor's "heirs at law." The wife by her
divorce put herself out of that category and since there was
never any seisin in the settlor during coverture, dower did
not attach, since in Massachusetts dower does not attach to
an equitable interest.
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For the purpose of the question of defeating the right of
inheritance, this case is not particularly helpful, and is of
greatest interest in its holding that the right of revocation is
consistent with a valid trust.
Without analyzing all of the facts therein stated, Kelley
v. Snow, 70 N. E. 89, also cited in the Rosahl case, may be
said to be definite authority for the proposition that a revocable
trust created to evade the Inheritance or Will Statutes, will
not be enforced by Courts of Equity.
McEvoy vs. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 201 Mass.
50, involved a grant of moneys to a trustee for the benefit of
the settlor and at her death, to certain cestuis. There was a
right of revocation reserved. The court held that this was a
trust during the lifetime of the settlor but, as to the balance
of the trust, effective at her death; it was testamentary and
not being executed in accordance with the Will Statutes, could
not be enforced.
Brown v. Crafts, 56 Atl. 213, involved an attempted gift
of securities to the daughter of a testator. These securities
were subject of a bill of sale or assignment by which the testator sought to transfer the property to his daughter, taking back
a power of attorney under which he was to receive the property, manage and control it, have the use and income of it,
the right to pledge it for his personal debts, or to sell it and to
use the same as though it were his own property. A bill of
sale was executed to the daughter, who checked each item of
the securities with the schedule in the bill of sale, received the
securities, and then in turn signed the power of attorney and
redelivered the securities to the donor for handling by him in
accordance with the terms of the power of attorney. In holding that this was not a completed gift, the court said (at page
214):
"What was done by the donor and donee was one and the same transaction. We think the delivery of the property was incomplete. It was colorable, not real. This attempted transfer, having the semblance of a gift, but
the substance of a will, was nugatory. The dominion which the donor retained over the property during his life was as full as if the disposition had
been by will, and the rights and enjoyment of the donee were postponed until
his death. It appears that subsequently to the date of the bill of sale, in pursuance of legal advice received by John H. Eveleth on the subject of the gift
to his daughter, she received the key to the safe in which the property was de-
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posited, and temporarily took it into her possession; but this does not, in our
view, change the nature of the original transaction. It tended rather to disclose its character as not being bona fide. The letter of the donor to the donee,
advising this course, and reiterating the fact that the property was hers, was
simply artificial evidence created for the purpose of proving the execution of
the original gift."

Having thus determined, the Court said it was unnecessary to determine the second proposition advanced, namely,
that this disposition of personal property had for its purpose
the deprivation of the wife of her distributive share and was
therefore void.
And yet we find the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Wlindolph v. Girard Trust Co. et al., 91 Atl., sustaining a
trust by a married woman wherein she reserved the beneficial
interest during her life with the power of revocation. For
the reason that this article is already too long the interesting
facts in the Windolph case will not be analyzed, but the following quotation, at page 638, is given:
"We do not agree with the appellant that the deed was a fraud upon his
marital rights. It is the settled law in this state, as was the common law, that
during his life a man may dispose of his personal estate, by voluntary gift or
otherwise, as he pleases, and it is not a fraud upon the rights of his widow or
children. Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts, 89; Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281;
Dickerson's App., 115 Pa. 198, 8 Atl. 64, 2 Am. St. Rep. 547. This power
arises from the fact that he is the absolute owner, and hence may make a gift,
declare a trust, or otherwise dispose of his personal property at his pleasure.
During his life his wife and children have no vested interest in his personal
estate, and hence they cannot complain of any disposition he sees fit to make of
it. Their right to his property attaches only at his death." . . . "In Lines v.
Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809, 24 Am. St. Rep. 487, we held that the good
faith required of the donor or settlor in making a valid disposition of his property during life does not refer to the purpose to affect his wife, but to the intent
to divest himself of the ownership of the property. It is therefore apparent
that the fraudulent intent which will defeat a gift inter vivos cannot be predicated of the husband's intent to deprive the wife of her distributive share in
his estate as widow."

However, the court on appeal bottomed its decision in
large part on the following finding by the referee as stated
by the lower court (page 637) :
"There was no evidence before the referee that would justify a finding
that the deed of trust in this case was gotten up as a mere subterfuge to permit
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Annie Windolph in her lifetime to possess and control her estate and at the
same time to be free of the post mortem claims of her husband. She fully intended to and actually did assign and deliver to the trustee the property in
question for the purposes set forth in the deed and under the advice of counsel
she endeavored to effectuate her intention by fully complying with the requirements of law."

It is quite apparent that the Pennsylvania cases go much
further than any of the other decisions in sustaining, as against
the claims of heirs at law, a trust wherein the settlor reserves
the income from the estate for life and the beneficial enjoyment of the cestuis other than the settlor-cestui is postponed

until the death of the maker of the instrument.

THE TRIAL OF A PRESIDENT
By Louis A. Hellerstein of the Denver Bar
HE Chief Justice of the United States was announced,
the Hon. Salmon P. Chase. He was ushered in and
assumed his place as the presiding officer. His official
black gown lent its dignity to the occasion. He faced curved
rows of desks behind which were seated fifty-four Senators,
representing twenty-seven states and nearly forty millions of
people. From a side room entered five men who seated themselves at a table placed at the right of the Chief Justice. At
the first chair was seated Henry Stanbery, Ex-Attorney General, who resigned his office in order that he might assist in
the defense of the President, a man of commanding presence
and dignity, now in his 65th year, ill but yet courageously
nerving himself for the affray. At his left sat Benjamin
Curtis, Ex-Justice of the Supreme Court, a leader of the
Massachusetts Bar and author of one of the two dissenting
opinions of the Dred Scott decision. Next to him was seated
Judge Thomas Nelson, one of the ablest attorneys of Tennessee and an intimate friend of the President. On Nelson's
left was seen a thin faced, tall, lank figure, a familiar one in
Washington, William M. Evarts, a master of oratory and
eloquence. The fifth of the counsel for the President was
William Groesbeck of Cincinnati, a stranger to the public,
yet destined to make his name a by-word upon the lips of his
countrymen, who had been substituted at the last moment for
Jeremiah Black who resigned as counsel when the President
refused to permit our ships to enter into a conflict of interests
over the rights on the island of Alta Vela near San Domingo.
Their entrance was quiet but impressive, and had a bearing of
confidence.
After the President's counsel were seated, next were
ushered in and proclaimed "The Honorable Managers on
behalf of the House of Representatives", two by two each
linking their arms in couples. Their leader was Benjamin
Butler, a man of massive appearance and bald of head, except
for a fringe of oily curls. His unattractive person emanated
cunning and insincerity. The others were George S. Boutwell, John A. Bingham, Thomas Williams, James F. Wilson
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and John A. Logan, the former two being recognized as able
lawyers, the latter being obscure and unknown in the courts.
The order of entrance was somewhat broken by the entrance
of a vengeful and implacable personage, bent with age and
with the hand of death hovering over him, that misguided
patriot, Thaddeus Stevens, also one of the Managers of the
House in charge of the impeachment. The Sergeant at arms
next announced the accusers and there was ushered in the
members of the House of Representatives headed by the Hon.
Elihu B. Washburne.
The galleries were crowded with men and women alike.
The women were robed in splendor of gown and society in
and near Washington being represented. All alike straining
to see and hear the proceedings. All were present, accusers,
defenders, and the Judge, but the impeached, the defendant
was not present and at no time during his trial did he appear.
What a disappointment to those in the galleries.
This was the day of the trial of Andrew Johnson upon the
charges of his impeachment. The Senate had previously met
and upon presentation of the charges by the House of Representatives, had set a day for hearing. On March 13, 1868, the
day of the hearing, counsel for the President had read a statement authorizing them to appear for him, and asked forty
days to prepare an answer. Benjamin Butler responded that
this was as much time "as God had taken to destroy the world
by flood". After deliberation ten days was allowed. Then a
replication to the answer was filed and on March 30, 1868,
the actual proceedings for impeachment were commenced.
The impeachment was a culmination of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches of the government. After the assassination of President Lincoln, Andrew
Johnson as Vice-President was sworn in as President. Calm
and possessed, he swore to uphold his duties. What a time for
a President to be called upon to make decisions. The Civil
War just over; the slaves a problem; the states in insurrection
a problem. The new President was besieged on all sides with
advice and counsel. The Congress had nothing but contempt
for the President and met immediately to put him in his place.
Another condition had arisen which was very detrimental,
namely, the policy of creating hosts of offices to be filled and
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vacated at each election. The Congress fearing the power of
the President to remove officials and particularly his cabinet
members drew up and in final form passed the Tenure-ofOffice Act. In the past, power of removal was exercised by
various Presidents and no question as to their right under the
constitution to do so had been raised. The purpose of the act
was to directly affect the power of the President to remove
the Cabinet Officers who were appointed before the death of
President Lincoln. The first section of the Act recited that
"Cabinet officers should hold their office for and during the
term of the President appointing them". The other sections
are not material for the purpose of this.discussion.
When President Johnson assumed his office, Edward M.
Stanton was Secretary of War, having been appointed by
Lincoln. There is an interesting story related concerning the
appointment of Stanton, who was a Cincinnati lawyer. It
seemed that Lincoln was called upon and retained in an important case in which Stanton was involved as his co-counsel.
Stanton insulted Lincoln by refusing to associate with him
or cooperateat the trial and is reported to have told his friends
that "nothing would induce him to associate with that damned,
gawky, long armed ape". It must however be said for Stanton that he had rendered loyal service during the trying period
of the war. He first gained national prominence as District
Attorney of the District of Columbia. His attitude in office
was insolent and overbearing to his superiors. He was greedy
for office and had a lust for the power it would give him. He
was by nature a spy, did not hesitate to deal with both parties
in the controversies of the times, if it tended to entrench his
own position. Such was the character of the man whom
Andrew Johnson attempted to remove to make way for the
appointment in his stead of Lorenzo Thomas. No self respecting President could have done otherwise.
With the Tenure of Office Act duly passed and after veto
by the President, passed over his veto to be placed upon the
Statute Books as a law, and the Congress avowedly intent upon
putting the President in his place, as they termed it, the news
of Stanton's removal caused a turmoil in both Houses. Stanton immediately appeared before Judge Carter of the Supreme Court and obtained a warrant for the arrest of Thomas
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returnable forthwith. The affidavit made by Stanton to obtain
the warrant was in effect that he was Secretary of War; that
the President's order appointing Thomas was void; that
Thomas threatened to forcibly oust him from office; that the
appointment was in violation of the Tenure of Office Act; that
it was a High Misdemeanor. Thomas was eating his breakfast when served with the warrant and since the writ was
returnable forthwith, left immediately and upon bond being
fixed for $5000.00, he immediately made the bond and was
released. The case was called up several days later and was
dismissed upon motion of defendant, counsel for petitioner
not objecting. Thomas never actually performed any of the
duties of Secretary of War during this period. He made demand for the office and was refused by Stanton who immediately barricaded himself in the office of the Secretary of
War. Thomas then occupied another office and claimed himself the rightfully appointed Cabinet member.
Like an avalanche unloosed, furious over the removal of
Stanton, the House of Representatives under their constitutional power, met to debate the impeachment of the President.
By a vote of 126, all Republicans, and a negative vote of 47,
all Democrats, the House, disliking the President and having
once tried and failed to impeach him, passed a resolution favoring impeachment. A committee of two were named to notify the Senate and a committee of seven Managers appointed
to prepare the articles. Eleven articles were finally adopted
and those of any importance related to the order of removal
of Stanton as a violation of the Tenure of Office Act and a conspiracy by force and intimidation to hinder the enforcement
of the act. The tenth article charged that the President was
guilty of a high misdemeanor in expressing his view and
opinion that "an act of Congress depriving him of powers
as Commander in Chief was unconstitutional". The eleventh
article was called the omnibus article, containing general
charges of usurpation of office.
With no precedents to be followed or decisions to be
used as authority many vexing questions were presented. One
question presented was whether the Senate was to sit as a
Court or a tribunal when an impeachftient question was presented. Also what was the authority and power of the Chief
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Justice. The Senate took the view that he was merely the
presiding officer and no more. Immediately upon the commencement of the trial, the Managers of the House who
brought the impeachment charges contended that the Senate
and not the Chief Justice was to rule upon the admissibility
of evidence. During the entire trial the Chief Justice would
rule and by a vote of the Senate he would be promptly overruled and upon such vote of the Senate the testimony permitted to be given or rejected as they directed. As a result,
much testimony was heard that was not proper under rules of
evidence due to the continual clash of inconsistent rulings by
the Chief Justice and the Senate, each claiming the power to
render the decision upon such matters.
Benjamin Butler made the opening argument in favor
of impeachment and read a carefully prepared manuscript.
After defining every offense impeachable "which the House
chose to impeach as proper," he attempted to distinguish the
position of the Senate from that of a court by the following
-argument. He stated, "as a constitutional tribunal solely you
are bound by no law, either statute or common which may
limit your prerogatives. You are a law unto yourselves, bound
only by the natural principles of equity and justice." He
further argued that the Senate could not be a court as they
could not be challenged for bias. Butler's attempt was to first
lay down an elastic definition of the offense, then establish a
convenient mode of proof and an absolute tribunal to pronounce it proved. As for proof, he stated, "we rely upon
common fame and current history."
James M. Wilson next followed in support of the Managers and read as proof of the charges the President's messages
submitting reasons for Stanton's suspension to the Senate.
After a week of submission of testimony and the examination
of various witnesses by the Managers, they rested their case.
Judge Curtis opened for the defense and ably argued that
Stanton's removal was not within the act since he was not
appointed by President Johnson, the Tenure of- Office Act
providing that they shall hold their office during the term of
the President appointing them. He further argued that an
erroneous construction by the President of an ambiguous Statute could not be proper grounds for impeachment. This argument was answered by the Managers by the contention that
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it was the duty of the President to obey and enforce the laws
without question as to their constitutionality and by reiterating
the argument that Stanton was within the Act since President
Johnson was serving out President Lincoln's term.
After other arguments for and against the impeachment,
William S. Groesbeck rose to speak as one of the counsel for
the President. He laid a foundation for his argument by
stating that four Judges and one Senator had been tried for
impeachment. In terse, concise and unmistakable language
he contended that the powers of the President were that, of
Chief Magistrate and not Constable. That the constitution
had so endowed him with that power and that the Congress
was without power or authority to attempt to lessen his authority. He stated that "it seemed hard, that anyone who has
served his country and borne himself well, should be condemned upon miserable technicalities".
Thaddeus Stevens, broken and bent and with his doctor
predicting he would not live through the trial, arose and read
his prepared argument. He protested that a mere mistake
persevered in after proper admonition was sufficient to warrant the removal of the President; and further that he was
unfit to grace the high office he occupied. He charged the
President with misprision of official perjury and defined it
"as breaking his official oath by obstructing the execution of
the Tenure-of-Office Act." He termed the President "an offspring of assassination".
William M. Evarts then followed for the President and
delivered an argument that is considered a classic of logic and
precise language. His contentions refuted a statement previously made by counsel, "that some lawyers' practice of their
profession sharpens, but does not enlarge their intellect". He
termed the impeachment, "an altar of sacrifice erected to the
savage demon of party hate".
Stanbery despite illness closed for the defense. He well
exemplified his powers as an orator and ended with a plea
for the President. He stated "steadfast and self reliant the
President stood in the midst of all difficulty, when dangers
threatened, when temptations were strong, he looked only to
the constitution for guidance. If you condemn him, mark
the prophecy, the strong arms of the people will be about him
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and he will be rewarded by the majestic voice of the people
exclaiming, well done faithful servant, you shall have your
reward."
Bingham then closed for the Managers of the House and
added nothing new. He too became oratorical and brought
rounds of applause from the gallery.
After the vote of not guilty, by failure of one vote, 36
votes being necessary for impeachment and only 35 being received, the ballot was duly recorded and by a very small margin a President was saved from impeachment at the hands of
his Congress in the struggle for supremacy and power and
readjustment of a great nation at a crucial moment in its
history.
The impeachment and trial of President Johnson are interesting not only from a historical standpoint but from a legal
standpoint and present the following legal controversies which
are of some moment and consideration:
1. What is the power of the Chief Justice of the United
States when presiding over the Senate at an impeachment
trial?
2. Is the Senate or the Chief Justice presiding at impeachment trial to render the decision as to the admissibility
of the evidence to be presented?
3. What is the duty of a President, when a law is clearly
unconstitutional?
4. Is the personal presence of the impeached officer in
this instance, the President, necessary at the trial?
5. Is the Supreme Court of the United States clothed
with the power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a cabinet
member, when the said member is acting under authorization
by the President of the United States?
6. When the Senate sits for impeachment is it a Court
to be bound by law or a constitutional tribunal to exercise its
own prerogatives?
The trial was unique as well in many instances and particularly because at no time was the President present at the
trial. It tended to solidify our governing power by demonstrating to a nation that President Andrew Johnson was not
a weak willed, easily swayed executive but an adamant superior who looked to the constitution of our country for guidance and support and whose reliance had been vindicated.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(Eorrom's NOTE: It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note interesting decisions
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the new Tenth Circuit, although
such are not trial decisions, the United States District Court, the Denver District
Court, the County Court, and occasionally the Juvenile Court.)

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS--10th CIRCUIT-

Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. Daisy
Fanning.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for
the District of Colorado. Decided January 27, 1930. Opinion
by Judge Lewis.
Facts.-Appellee on evening of March 2, 1927, at the
request of her husband, was riding with him in an automobile
on the way to a dance. The evening was very foggy. The
husband was driving the automobile at a rate of 12 miles per
hour. The highway passed over a bridge maintained by the
Railway Company which spanned a deep cut in which the
tracks of the Railway Company lay. Fifteen feet of the
road contiguous to and approaching the bridge was within the
railway's right of way. At the side of this approach, there
was a deep washout. The automobile went into the washout
and as a result appellee was injured. The complaint alleged
that the Railway Company was negligent in failing to fill in
the washout or maintain proper barriers. The jury found
for the appellee and a judgment was entered against the railway company on a verdict. The .railway company alleged
two principal errors: 1. That a fog would not necessarily
be anticipated by the railway company and that therefore
there was no proximate causation of the injury. 2. That the
question of negligence of appellee's husband should have been
submitted to the jury, and if he were negligent, such negligence should be imputable to appellee.
Held.-I. The issue of negligence and proximate causation was properly submitted to the jury. The washout in this
instance was on defendant's right of way and the defendant
would be responsible for its continuance. Landowners whose
properties adjoin adjacent public highways are bound to regulate their conduct and maintain an unguarded excavation on
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their premises in contemplation of the persons who travel upon
such highways. A reasonably prudent person should have
anticipated injury in this instance.
2. Negligence of the operator of a motor vehicle is not
imputable to a guest or passenger of such vehicle, and this
applies as well between a husband and wife as any other passenger or guest, unless the relation is such as to entitle the passenger to give direction, e. g. master and servant. This latter
relation did not exist in the instant case.
Judgment Affirmed.
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS--10th CIRCUIT-

C. I. T. Corporation vs. United States of America.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for
the District of Kansas. Decided January 29, 1930. Opinion
by Judge Cotteral.
Facts.-One Humbred was convicted for the transportation and possession of intoxicating liquors. A Reo coupe
which was in his hands was confiscated by the Government.
Plaintiff intervenor, at the time said Reo coupe was sold, had
taken an assignment of the conditional sales contract of the
automobile from the seller, and in this action sought possession
of the coupe under said sale contract or petitioned to have a
mortgage enforced thereon for the amount of the unpaid balance of the contract. Section 40-Title 27 of the U. S. Code
provides that any vehicle seized in the transportation of intoxicating liquors shall be ordered sold by the court "unless
good cause to the contrary is shown." The District Court
ordered a sale of this automobile. Intervenor appealed.
Held.-The intervenor had a lien interest under the sale
contract. Such interest is sufficient "good cause" and was
"created" without guilty notice to the intervenor. The intervenor therefore is awarded possession of the Reo coupe if its
value is less than the claim. If the automobile has been sold
then the net proceeds of the sale shall be turned over to intervenor or if the proceeds exceed the claim, the excess shall be
paid to the Treasury of the United States. Order Reversed;
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and case remanded for the entry of an order in accord with
the opinion.*
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS-10th CIRCUIT-

Blackburn Construction Company vs. Cedar Rapids National Bank.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Decided January 24, 1930.
Opinion by Judge Cotteral.
Facts.-Plaintiffin the lower court brought an action on
two promissory notes. The only material defense was that
of payment. At the conclusion of the trial, both sides moved
for a directed verdict. The Court thereupon ruled that the
motions withdrew the case from the jury and submitted it to
the court. After reviewing the testimony, the Judge directed
a verdict for the plaintiff bank and rendered a judgment on
such verdict. The defendant alleged error, first, in directing
a verdict for plaintiff and not for defendant; second, that the
court failed to submit additional instructions to the jury on
the issue of the discharge of the notes by payment.
'Held.-Motions by both parties for a directed verdict
without request for instructions are regarded as joint requests
for findings of fact by the court and a direction to the jury in
accordance with such findings and the law applicable to them,
thereby withdrawing the case from the jury. On appeal
therefor, the sole question open to review is whether or not
the findings of the court are based on substantial evidence and
the law correctly applied. This court having reviewed the
evidence finds it sufficient to support the findings of the District Judge.
Judgment Affirmed.
DENVER DISTRICT COURT-No. 100,086-DIV. 1-Quinn and

McGill Motor Supply Co. vs. Broadway Improvement &
Investment Co., et al.-Hon.Frank McDonough, Judge.
Facts.-One Brown leased certain premises from defendant Investment Company and remained in possession of the
*EDITOR'S NOTE: Compare the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Lindsley
v. Warner noted on page 33 of Dicta for February, 1930.
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premises until August 13, 1927. On that date plaintiff took
possession of the premises and certain property described in
a chattel mortgage executed in its favor by Brown, this property being located on said premises. Plaintiff removed the
property described in the mortgage, with the exception of an
electric sign. The last of this property being -removed on
August 13, 1927. The keys to the premises were then delivered to a representative of the Investment Company. The
electric sign in question was affixed to the building by heavy
iron bars which pierced the brick walls and by rods bolted to
the roof. Defendant Investment Company having found a
new tenant for the premises who insisted that the sign be removed, sold the sign in question for $200.00 -and the purchasers removed the same. The lease contained the following
provisions: "No hole shall be made or drilled in the stone or
brick work of said premises." "No alterations, additions or
fixtures of any kind shall be made to the premises without the
written consent of lessor endorsed on this agreement. All
such additions or fixtures shall, on the termination of this
agreement, remain and be the property of the lessor unless
otherwise agreed in writing by endorsement on this leese."
"Each tenant must upon termination of the tenancy hereby
created restore the keys of the demised premises to the lessor
or his agent." Plaintiff made a demand for said sign on November 25, 1927, and upon refusal of such demand filed this
action for conversion.
Trial was had before the Court.
Held.-1. The electric sign in question having been affixed to the building became the property of the landlord
according to the terms of the lease, and the attempt to include
it in the chattel mortgage to plaintiff was without right as
against the interest of lessor.
2. That the keys to the premises had been surrendered
to the owner and the premises had been abandoned by the
tenant as well as the mortgagee; that the demand and the
assertion of right to the sign by plaintiff company was a mere
after thought, and the plaintiff cannot recover therefor because of the abandonment of the property.
Judgment for Defendant.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITOR'S NoTa.-It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

BILLS AND NOTES-DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY-DESCRIPTION IN SCHEDULE-No. 12,531--Kobebell v. Diers Bros.-

Decided February 3, 1930.
Facts.-Diers Bros. brought suit on a promissory note
against Kobebell and recovered judgment in the lower court.
The defense was that Kobebell had received a discharge in
bankruptcy. In listing a description of this indebtedness in
his bankruptcy petition he describes the note as being owed
to Frank Baker of Scotts Bluffs, Nebraska, and not as being
owed to Diers Bros. It seems that the manager for Diers
Bros. at Scotts Bluffs, Nebaska, was a man by the name of
F. R. Becker that Diers Bros. never had either actual or constructive notice of the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings
and never filed any claim therein.
Held.-I. A general assignment of error on the ground
that a motion for new trial has been granted or denied without specifying particular errors will not be considered.
2. Fact findings of a trial court upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on review.
3. The attempted description of a promissory note in
the bankrupt's petition was in no respect a compliance with
the Bankruptcy Law and constituted no notice whatsoever to
Diers Bros. and his discharge in bankruptcy did not operate
to discharge him from this particular debt.
Judgment Affirmed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES -

AUTOMOBILES

-

CONVERSION

-

No.

12,438-Mosko v. Matthews-Decided Feb. 3, 1930.
Facts.-Matthews brought an action in conversion against
Mosko and others to recover the value of an automobile
claimed by Matthews under a foreign chattel mortgage.
Mosko defended on the ground that he was an innocent pur-
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chaser of the automobile for value, and that the mortgage was
not recorded in Colorado.
Held.-l. A chattel mortgage properly executed and
recorded according to the law of the place where the mortgage
is executed and the property is located will, if valid there, be
held valid even as against creditors and purchasers in good
faith in another state to which the property is removed by
the mortgagor unless there is some statute in that state to the
contrary, or unless the transaction contravenes the settled law
or policy of the forum.
2. The validity of the mortgage is determined by the
law of the place where it was made at the time the chattel
was there located.
3. The employment of the rule of comity is conducive
to mutual good-will between states, and is necessary to law in
custom.
4. The old strict rule of pleading and proving statutes
of other states should be relaxed.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-LEADING QUESTIONS-MISCONDUCT
OF JUDGE-No. 12,395-Ewing v. People-Decided Janu-

ary 20, 1930.
Facts.-Ewing was tried and convicted of rape. The
prosecuting witness was a girl fourteen years of age, and the
district attorney asked her leading questions. In the examination, the attorney for the defendant objected to an answer on
the ground that it was prejudicial and the Judge, in his remarks, said it was prejudicial, but overruled the objection.
This was assigned as error.
Held.-1. The method of examining a witness is in the
discretion of the trial court even on the question of asking
leading questions unless it clearly appears that the defendant
was thereby denied a fair trial.
2. The remark of the trial court was not reversable
error, nor was there any misconduct on the part of the prosecuting attorney.
Judgment Affirmed.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SUFFIENCY OF EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS-

No. 12,371-Bowen vs. People-Decided Jan. 27, 1930.

Facts.-Bowen was convicted of the crime of taking indecent liberties with the person of a girl ten years of age. He
was sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary.
Held.-The evidence satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. The fact that the
trial judge refused to set aside the verdict and grant a new
trial indicates that his reason and conscience approved the
verdict. In the circumstances we cannot say that the verdict
was unsupported by the evidence.
2. The instruction given by the Court when the jury,
after being out for several hours, failed to reach an agreement,
is approved. This instruction was substantially the same as
one approved in Sevilla v. People, 65 Colo. 437.
Judgment Affirmed.
DEPENDENT

CHILDREN-JUVENILE

COURT-RIGHTS

AS TO

CUSTODY-No. 12,227-Saum v. Freiberg-DecidedFeb.

3,1930.
Facts.-Annie Freiberg, maternal grandmother, filed in
the juvenile court a petition declaring that her three grandchildren were dependent on the ground that the mother was
deceased and that the father of said children was not a fit and
proper person to have the custody, care, and control of the
children. The lower court awarded the children to the grandmother.
Held.-In dependency cases the welfare of the children is
paramount. As between a grandmother and a father of the
children the custody awarded to the grandmother will prevail
where it appears that the children have a marked aversion to
the father and to his second wife who would share in the custody if their custody were awarded to the father. The lower
court's finding that the grandmother was a more suitable person to have their care, custody, and control is supported by
the evidence.
Judgment Affirmed.
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-ACTION TO SET ASIDE-EQUITY

No. 12,498-Roberts, et al. vs. Dietz, et al.-Decided Jan.
6,1930.
Facts.-Dietzbrought suit to set aside a Trust Deed given
by Roberts to secure the. payment of certain promissory notes
on the ground that the trust deed was given with the intent
to hinder and delay Dietz in the collection of certain debts
and for the purpose of defrauding him. At the time of the
conveyance, the grantee was a bona fide creditor of the grantor.
Held.-Where the grantee was a bona fide creditor of
the grantor at the time of the conveyance, then the mere fact
that the grantee knows that giving him a preference might or
even would hinder or delay another creditor in the collection
of his claim is not enough to deprive the grantee of his preference. The mere fact that the grantee knew that a verdict had
been rendered against the grantor did not charge the grantee
with notice that in giving the trust deed demanded by the
grantee that the grantor was willing or even desired to postpone the collection of the judgment. Burden of proof is on
the grantee to show good faith.
Judgment Reversed.
INJUNCTION-

BONDHOLDERS-

NECESSARY PARTIES-

No.

12,250-Denver Land Company v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District-DecidedJanuary 20, 1930.
Facts.-The Denver Land Company brought action to
enjoin Tunnel District and the commissioners from levying
assessments to pay interest on supplemental tunnel bonds on
the ground that the bond issue was illegal and void. None
of the bondholders were made party defendants although attorneys for all parties below stipulated that they were not necessary parties.
Held.-Courtbelow was without jurisdiction where none
of the bondholders were made parties in the absence of a
showing why they were not made parties. All bondholders
within the jurisdiction should be made parties, or failing this
a showing be made as to the reason for their non-joinder.
Judgment Reversed with Directions.
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12,192
Sturner v. McCandless Investment Company, et al.-Decided Jan. 27, 1930.
Facts.-This proceeding presents the question whether in
the circumstances disclosed by the record, Sturner is entitled
to a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the transfer upon
the books of the investment company of 937 shares of capital
stock. In the trial below, McCandless as administrator tendered his verified petition in intervention and applied for
leave to intervene, claiming ownership of the certificates in
question. The Court denied the application to intervene.
Held.-l. In a proper case mandamus will lie to compel
the issuance of stock certificates.
2. However, this is not a proper case because no one
is entitled to a writ of mandamus whose right is not clear and
unquestionable; if there is a doubt about his right, mandamus
will not lie. The fact that a petition of intervention was tendered by a third party claiming ownership shows that plaintiff's right and title to the stock was in controversy, and it was
proper to dismiss the proceeding.
Judgment Affirmed.
MANDAMUS-TRANSFER OF STOCK CERTIFICATES-No.

RES ADJUDICATA-VEXATIOUS SuIT-No. 12,217-London v.

Allison-Decided Jan. 27, 1930.
Facts.-London, plaintiff in error and plaintiff below
seeks to review a judgment of dismissal based upon a plea of
res adjudicata. The complaint was in three counts and charged
that plaintiff was employed by defendant, and in January,
1920, a partnership was formed whereby he was to receive
each year, in addition to his salary, one-fifth of the yearly net
profits; in a second cause of action, he attempted to hold the
defendant as trustee for the amount alleged to be due under
the first cause of action; and the third cause of action was for
the reasonable value of his services. A plea of res adjudicata
was interposed.
Held.-While the former suit might be termed a suit for
an accounting, and the present action is based upon express
agreement, nevertheless the former suit sought to, and did
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adjudicate defendant's rights under the identical agreement
pleaded in the instant case. This is a typical case of res
adjudicata.
The record discloses that this suit was vexatiously instituted and prosecuted, and plaintiff should therefore pay the
amount of defendant's attorneys' fees, to be taxed as costs, for
the determination of which amount the case will be remanded.
Judgment Affirmed and Case Remanded.

SCHOOL

DISTRICTS-TEACHER-BREACH

OF

CONTRACT-

DAMAGES--No. 12,437-Cheyenne County High School,

Dist. 1, vs. Graves-DecidedFebruary 3, 1930.
Facts.-Graves brought this action in the District Court
and obtained judgment against Cheyenne County High School
District 1 on a contract for services as its superintendent of
schools. He prevailed below. The district employed him
at a stated salary for one year commencing Aug. 1, 1925, and
three days later on Aug. 4th, without any charges being filed
or any hearing given Graves, he was discharged.
Held.-l. The findings of the trial Court, that Graves was
discharged by motion carried on Aug. 4th and the keys taken
from him on the 17th of August without any charges having
been filed nor hearing had as required by statute, were sustained by the evidence.
2. The School District could not cure this by a later
meeting and at a purported hearing attempt to ratify the previous discharge. The School District's breach was committed
on August 4th which marks the date when plaintiff's cause of
action arose.
Judgment Affirmed.

